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THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION OF THE 
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION  
REFORM ACT 
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A.C. PRITCHARD***
ABSTRACT 
When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 
1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece 
of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. 
The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors 
and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the 
largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead 
plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the 
terms of counsel’s compensation. 
Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was 
to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual funds, hedge 
funds, etc.—to come forward to serve as lead plaintiff. The theory was that 
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an institutional investor with a substantial damages claim would have the 
incentive to bargain hard with class counsel on behalf of the class, 
reducing the percentage of the recovery awarded to class counsel. 
Congress also expected institutions to play an oversight role, monitoring to 
make sure that class counsel was vigorously pursuing claims on behalf of 
the class and not settling claims on the cheap. 
Our study offers evidence on the extent to which the lead plaintiff 
provision furthers these goals. We have collected two samples of securities 
class actions—one from 1991 to 1995 (pre-PSLRA) and one from 1996 to 
2000 (post-PSLRA). We compare the class representatives from the two 
periods to determine if institutional investors are stepping forward in 
significantly greater numbers. We also sort the institutional investors—
distinguishing public from private—to see what types of investors have 
stepped forward to serve as lead plaintiff. Consistent with other research, 
we find a significant difference only in the number of public institutions 
serving as lead plaintiff. 
Our sample also allows us to analyze the impact of the lead plaintiff 
provision: Does the presence of an institutional investor increase the 
likelihood of a high-value settlement? Despite the visible participation of 
institutions in several high-profile cases, we find no systematic evidence 
that private institutional lead plaintiffs are associated with larger class 
recoveries. Public pension fund lead plaintiffs, on the other hand, are 
correlated with higher class recoveries as a fraction of the potential 
damage award in the post-PSLRA period. Our results are, however, 
consistent with the possibility that public pensions “cherry-pick” the 
actions in which they seek to become lead plaintiff, selecting only the 
cases with the largest potential damages and the strongest evidence of 
fraud. Further analysis is needed to evaluate this possibility.  
We also evaluate the effect of lead plaintiffs on the selection of 
attorneys and attorneys’ fees. We find that, for the time period of our 
study, institutional investors tended to avoid the Milberg Weiss plaintiffs’ 
attorney firm. On the more fundamental issue of whether the presence of 
an institutional investor as a lead plaintiff reduces the fees paid to the 
lawyers, after controlling for the size of the case, we find no systematic 
evidence that institutional involvement correlates with lower fee awards. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress adopted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”)1 in response to widespread claims of frivolous securities fraud 
litigation. The PSLRA contains a variety of provisions designed to limit 
litigation and to reduce the settlement value of non-meritorious or 
nuisance claims. These provisions include a heightened pleading 
requirement,2 a safe harbor from liability for forward-looking statements,3 
a requirement that plaintiffs prove loss causation,4 a mandatory discovery 
stay pending a motion to dismiss,5 and the replacement of joint and several 
liability with proportionate liability for collateral defendants.6 
The PSLRA also contains a novel provision aimed at increasing client 
control over litigation—the lead plaintiff provision. This provision 
requires the court to appoint a statutory lead plaintiff in all securities fraud 
class actions to oversee the litigation.7 The provision also establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that, among those motioning to become lead 
plaintiff, the plaintiff with the largest financial interest in the relief sought 
by the class will be selected as the lead plaintiff.8 Finally, the lead plaintiff 
provision vests the lead plaintiff selected with authority to select and retain 
class counsel.9 
Almost ten years have passed since the adoption of the PSLRA—
presumably enough time to assess the statute’s effects. A variety of 
empirical studies have examined these effects. In particular, studies have 
sought to determine whether plaintiffs file fewer frivolous cases 
subsequent to the enactment of the statute,10 whether the statute affects the 
 1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-1 to 78j-1 (2000) 
[hereinafter “PSLRA”]. 
 2. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000). 
 3. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); id. § 21E. 
 4. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4). 
 5. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A; id. § 21D(b)(4). 
 6. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(f). Outside directors also enjoy proportionate 
liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f)(2). 
 7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). 
 10. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? The 
Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2007). 
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rate at which cases are dismissed,11 and whether the statute deters the 
filing of some meritorious claims.12 
To date, however, few studies have looked at whether the lead plaintiff 
provision is achieving its intended goals. Are institutional investors 
responding to the congressional invitation and seeking appointment as lead 
plaintiffs, or has the adoption of the PSLRA made little difference in the 
identity of class representatives in securities fraud litigation? Are 
particular types of institutions, such as public pension funds, becoming 
generally more active, or is their involvement limited to a handful of high-
visibility, large-stakes cases? Most important from a policy perspective, 
does institutional involvement matter? Does institutional service as lead 
plaintiff correlate with higher recoveries or lower attorneys’ fees? If so, 
are there reasons to suspect a causal relationship? 
This Article offers empirical evidence on the effects of the lead 
plaintiff provision. By comparing two case samples, one of cases filed 
prior to the adoption of the PSLRA and the other from the post-PSLRA 
period, the Article analyzes whether the level or type of institutional 
involvement has changed. The Article goes on to assess the post-PSLRA 
effect of institutional involvement in general, and public pension fund 
involvement in particular, on recoveries and attorneys’ fees. 
Our study’s findings offer modest support for the lead plaintiff 
provision. The study finds that, although the adoption of the PSLRA did 
not lead to increased involvement by private institutions, it did correlate 
with a substantial increase in involvement by public pension funds. The 
effects of this involvement are less clear. We find that public pension 
funds are significantly correlated with high-value outcome cases, defined 
as outcomes involving a settlement of more than five percent of the stakes. 
We are unable to rule out, however, the possibility that public pension 
funds may simply be cherry-picking—choosing to become involved 
mainly in high-profile cases in which the likelihood of liability and the 
recoverable damages are the highest. Similarly, despite anecdotal evidence 
suggesting that public pension funds have increased market discipline over 
fee agreements, we find no significant effect on attorneys’ fee awards. 
 11. See A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions 
to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125 
(2005). 
 12. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act?, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2007). 
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It is unclear how to interpret these results. As institutional involvement 
has grown very slowly since the adoption of the PSLRA, it is possible that 
institutions are still learning how to exercise their authority effectively and 
that, with continued involvement, they will reduce the agency costs in 
securities fraud litigation. Alternatively, agency problems and political 
factors may be too much for institutional investors to overcome, leaving 
them largely unable to realize the objectives intended by Congress. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly sets out the background 
and purposes of the PSLRA. Part III describes existing evidence of the 
effects of the lead plaintiff provision. Part IV explains the hypotheses that 
we seek to test in this study. Part V describes our data set. Part VI presents 
our empirical tests and findings. Part VII considers the broader 
implications of the study and suggests additional avenues for future 
research.  
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSES OF THE PSLRA 
The PSLRA was enacted over President Clinton’s veto13 following an 
extensive lobbying campaign by accounting firms, corporate leaders and 
members of the securities industry, who complained that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers were filing excessive and frivolous cookie-cutter complaints, 
often on the basis of no more than a sudden drop in stock price, in an 
effort to coerce nuisance settlements.14 Critics described meritless lawsuits 
as having a “blackmail effect” and forcing “innocent” firms to settle rather 
than endure the high costs of vindicating themselves through litigation.15 
Members of Congress relied heavily on empirical research by Janet 
Cooper Alexander16 reporting that securities fraud class actions were 
 13. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 725 
(1996). 
 14. See John Harwood, House, in 325–99 Vote, Approves Bill To Curb Fraud Suits Against 
Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1995, at A3 (describing industry concerns); see also Jeffrey Taylor, 
Accountants’ Campaign Contributions Are About To Pay Off in Legislation on Lawsuit Protection, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A22 (detailing lobbying efforts by accounting firms for securities 
litigation reform). 
 15. Peter M. Saparoff, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Illusion or Reality, 
in 2 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND 
STRATEGIES FOR THE ‘90S AND BEYOND 505, 507 (1996). 
 16. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). Alexander’s study has been criticized. See, e.g., Leonard 
B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation: The Erroneous Academic 
Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 
964 (1996) (arguing that Alexander’s study contained methodological errors and erroneous 
conclusions). 
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settled without regard for the merits of their claims at a formulaic twenty-
five cents on the dollar.17  
Congress’s perception that securities fraud class actions were “lawyer-
driven litigation” was a separate, although related, concern.18 Congress 
heard testimony that lawyers maintained stocks of professional plaintiffs, 
willing to file suit at the lawyer’s request. Class representatives seemed to 
have little involvement in or control over litigation decisions. Perhaps 
most important, lawsuit outcomes appeared to favor the interests of class 
counsel over the class itself—generally resulting in substantial fee awards 
but often providing limited compensation to class members.19  
The PSLRA responded to these concerns in several ways. It attempted 
to reduce frivolous litigation by enacting a variety of procedural and 
substantive hurdles to litigation. These hurdles included an enhanced 
pleading requirement which requires plaintiffs to state with particularity, 
in a complaint alleging fraud under Rule 10b-5 or other antifraud 
provisions of the Exchange Act, “facts giving rise to a strong inference 
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”20 The statute 
adopted a safe harbor for forward-looking statements designed to reduce 
the litigation risk associated with making predictions or estimates that 
were subsequently not met.21 This provision was intended to provide 
particular protection to high technology issuers, for whom failure to meet 
projections had resulted in frequent litigation. The PSLRA added section 
21D(b)(4) to the Exchange Act, an affirmative requirement that plaintiffs 
 17. See Simon & Dato, supra note 16, at 960 n.4 (citing examples of congressional reliance on 
Alexander’s study).  
 18. See John Harwood, House Votes Bill Requiring Losing Party To Pay Winner's Fees in 
Certain Suits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A3 (describing a series of legal reform bills as originating 
in the GOP’s “Contract with America”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, at § 202 (1995) (provision of 
the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995 entitled “Prevention of Lawyer-Driven Litigation”). 
 19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 36 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730 
(observing that lawyers “often receive a disproportionate share of settlement awards”); S. REP. NO. 
104-98, at 9 (1995) (complaining that, although investors recover only “pennies on the dollar,” much 
of the $1.4 billion paid during 1994 alone went to plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
 20. Securities Exchange of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000). The “strong inference” 
language of the statute has generated substantial controversy in the courts due to inconsistencies in 
various components of the legislative history. Compare Janas v. McCracken (In re Silicon Graphics 
Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that PSLRA requires plaintiff to plead 
“deliberate recklessness”), with Press v. Chem. Inventory Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 
1999) (interpreting statute as codifying prior Second Circuit approach, which required only facts 
giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness). The plaintiff is also required to identify specific 
misleading statements, to state why they are misleading, and to state with particularity the basis for all 
pleadings made on information and belief.  
 21. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 21E. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/1
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prove loss causation.22 Loss causation is an element of securities fraud, 
borrowed by the courts from negligence law, that requires the plaintiff to 
establish a sufficient causal nexus between the defendant’s 
misrepresentations and the plaintiff’s loss.23 Congress also responded to 
concerns about discovery costs by imposing a mandatory stay of discovery 
while a motion to dismiss was pending.24  
In addition, the PSLRA included several other limitations designed to 
reduce the expected value of securities fraud litigation to both the plaintiff 
class and its lawyers. The statute substituted proportionate liability for 
joint and several liability, providing that defendants, other than those who 
knowingly violate the securities laws, will only be liable for that portion of 
the judgment that corresponds to their responsibility for the fraud.25 
Section 21D(e) modestly limited the damages available in fraud-on-the-
market cases.26 Finally, the statute restricted fee awards to a reasonable 
percentage of the damages actually paid to the plaintiff class.27 
In an effort to ameliorate the problem of lawyer control, the PSLRA 
attempted to increase the role of the class representative.28 The PSLRA 
created the role of a statutory lead plaintiff. Lawyers filing a securities 
fraud class action are required to publish a notice of the filing, and, within 
ninety days of that notice, the court must appoint a lead plaintiff.29 The 
statute instructs the court to appoint as lead plaintiff the class member 
“most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members,” 
and provides a rebuttable presumption that the most adequate plaintiff, 
among those seeking to become lead plaintiff, is “the person or group of 
persons that . . . has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the 
class.”30 The lead plaintiff is then charged with overseeing the litigation 
 22. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4). 
 23. Recently, the Supreme Court held that loss causation requires more than an allegation that the 
fraud inflated the price of the security. Plaintiffs must also plead that the fraud caused the plaintiff’s 
“economic loss.” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1634 (2005). 
 24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(3)(B). 
 25. See id. § 21D(f). Proportionate liability applies for antifraud causes of action under the 
Exchange Act. Section 11(f) of the Securities Act extends the proportionate liability regime to outside 
directors facing liability. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A. 
 26. PSLRA § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(e)(1) (2000); see Nathaniel Carden, Comment, 
Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of 
Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 894 (1998) (examining and criticizing this limitation). 
 27. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(6). 
 28. See John C. Coffee Jr., The PSLRA and Auctions, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 2001, at 5–6 (explaining 
that the legislative history of the PSLRA clearly indicated that Congress wanted to replace “lawyer-
driven” litigation with “client-driven” litigation). 
 29. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 30. Id. § 21D(a)(3)(B). In addition, the lead plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc). 
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and, most importantly, is given the statutory authority to select and retain 
class counsel, subject to the approval of the court.31 The premise of the 
provision, inspired by a proposal by Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman, 
was that it would increase the participation of sophisticated plaintiffs with 
substantial stakes, who would have the appropriate incentives to monitor 
class counsel.32 Weiss and Beckerman also predicted that the repeated 
participation of large investors would increase market discipline of 
attorneys’ fee awards.33 
A number of empirical studies have offered evidence on whether the 
PSLRA has been effective in meeting Congress’s goals. These studies, of 
course, have their limitations. For example, a study by the National 
Economics Research Associates (“NERA”) reports a statistically 
significant growth trend in filings since 1991 but, controlling for that 
trend, finds that the PSLRA had no statistically significant impact on 
filings.34 Michael Perino finds that the passage of the PSLRA is correlated 
with an increased number of issuers facing a securities fraud suit.35 These 
results suggest that the statute has not been effective in reducing the 
quantity of litigation. On the other hand, an analysis of filing statistics 
does not control for the amount of fraud during the time period, nor does it 
indicate whether the nature of the litigation has shifted to favor high 
quality cases. Marilyn Johnson, Karen Nelson, and Adam Pritchard find 
that filings after the PSLRA correlate more strongly with factors related to 
merit.36 Their study suggests that the PSLRA has shifted litigation away 
from weak claims and toward stronger cases. Another possibility, 
consistent with this finding, is that the PSLRA has also reduced the filing 
of meritorious cases. A study by Stephen Choi shows that the litigation 
 31. Id. § 21D(a)(3). 
 32. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 
(1995); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 n.32 (1995) (stating that the Weiss and Beckerman article “provided 
the basis for the ‘most adequate plaintiff’ provision”). 
 33. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 32, at 2106–07. 
 34. See ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., NATIONAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RECENT 
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: WILL ENRON AND SARBANES-OXLEY CHANGE 
THE TIDES? 4 (2003), available at http://www.nera.com/Publication.asp?p_ID=115&login=6923124. 
Nor did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 affect the number of filings. Id. 
 35. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 913, 932 (2003). Perino argues that this increase may be due to efforts by plaintiffs’ lawyers to 
seek increased portfolio diversification by bringing more actions and reducing their investment in each 
case. Id. at 936–37. 
 36. See Johnson et al., supra note 10.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/1
p 869 Choi Fisch Pritchard book pages.doc 4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? 877 
 
 
 
 
 
 
barriers of the PSLRA are deterring some non-nuisance suits that lack 
“hard evidence” of fraud.37 
III. EFFECTS OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION 
The effectiveness of the lead plaintiff provision is a matter of some 
dispute. It is uncontroverted that the number of institutions participating as 
lead plaintiffs following the adoption of the PSLRA was initially quite 
small. In a report on the first year of practice under the PSLRA, the SEC 
reported that institutional investors became lead plaintiffs in only eight of 
105 filed cases.38 A study of the following year found nine institutional 
lead plaintiffs in 175 cases.39 Academic commentary has generally 
reported that the PSLRA has been unsuccessful in encouraging 
institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs.40 Commentators have 
particularly highlighted the total failure of certain types of institutional 
investors, such as mutual funds, to participate.41 
More recent data suggest that institutional participation is increasing. A 
rough analysis of cases filed in 2001 found institutions serving as lead 
plaintiffs in approximately 10% of the cases.42 A 2004 study released by 
Cornerstone Research reports that institutions have served as lead 
plaintiffs in approximately 30% of post-PSLRA cases through December 
2003, a figure that Cornerstone described as a substantial increase from the 
pre-PSLRA participation rate.43 A PricewaterhouseCoopers study reported 
 37. See Choi, supra note 12. 
 38. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION 
REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 51 (1997). 
 39. Elayne Demby, Ducking Lead Plaintiff Status, (May 1999), http://www.assetpub.com/ 
archive/ps/99-05psmay/may99PS58a.html. 
 40. See, e.g., Farah Z. Usmani, Note, Inequities in the Resolution of Securities Disputes: 
Individual or Class Action; Arbitration or Litigation, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 193, 203 (2001) 
(stating that “[t]he new rules regarding lead plaintiff have not succeeded in encouraging more 
institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs”); Tiffany M. Wong, Note, Defendants' Standing to 
Oppose Lead Plaintiff Appointment Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2003 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 833, 844 (2003) (stating that “empirical evidence indicates that the PSLRA may not 
have achieved its intended effects of . . . encouraging more institutional investors to serve as lead 
plaintiffs”). 
 41. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”: Myth and Reality about the 
Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 247 (2001) (observing that 
“possibly the most noteworthy fact about the lead plaintiff selection process is that since the passage of 
the PSLRA, private institutional investors have virtually never volunteered for this role—while they 
do sometimes opt out and sue individually”). 
 42. See Edward R. Becker et al., Panel Discussion, The Private Securities Law Reform Act: Is it 
Working?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2363 (2003). 
 43. See LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT 
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that institutional investors represented 51% and 42% of lead plaintiffs, 
respectively, in all securities class actions filed in 2002 and 2003.44 In 
1996, union and public pension funds served as lead plaintiffs in less than 
3% of all cases filed.45 By 2003, the number increased to 28%.46 
The data on the effects of institutional participation are more limited. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers has reported that, since the adoption of the 
PSLRA, cases led by government or union pension funds have settled for 
six times as much as cases lacking a public pension fund lead plaintiff.47 
The report does not indicate any attempt to control for the size of the case, 
however. Public pension funds are particularly likely to participate in 
cases involving large public companies, both because of the high profile 
nature of those cases and because the dollar amounts of their losses are 
likely to be higher. As a result, we would expect to see those cases settle 
for a higher dollar amount, at least in absolute terms.48 
The increase in institutional participation in recent years may be due to 
several factors. One factor is increased experience under the PSLRA. As 
courts become more uniform in their interpretation of the lead plaintiff 
provision and institutions more experienced with the lead plaintiff role, the 
benefits of participation are more likely to outweigh the costs in a given 
case. A second factor is the evolving judicial preference for a single 
institutional lead plaintiff over a large group of individuals. Courts in 
some early post-PSLRA cases appeared to endorse the idea that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers could cobble together a group of hundreds or even thousands of 
lead plaintiffs and aggregate their losses.49 The more plaintiffs a lawyer 
SECURITIES LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2003, at 9 (2004), available 
at http://www.cornerstone.com/fram_res.html. 
 44. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 6, http://www.10b5. 
com/2003_study.pdf. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. (reporting that unions and public pension funds were lead plaintiffs in 27% of cases in 
2002 and 28% in 2003). 
 47. See Steven Skalak & Daniel Dooley, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION SERVICES: REPORT SECURITIES LITIGATION UPDATE—THE PENSION FUND FACTOR 1 
(2004), available at http://www.10b5.com/SecLit_Study_Pension_Fund_Supplement_jan04.pdf. 
 48. See LAURIE E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT 
SECURITIES SETTLEMENTS: UPDATED THROUGH DECEMBER 2004, at 9 (2005), available at 
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/Settlements_2004.pdf (explaining that part of the effect of 
institutional participation is the consequence of institutions participating in larger cases). The 
Cornerstone study states that “even after controlling for ‘estimated damages’ . . . the presence of an 
institutional investor as lead plaintiff is associated with a statistically significant increase in settlement 
size.” Id. The study offers no details, however, about the controls used.  
 49. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead 
Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67–68 (2001) (describing evolving 
judicial approach to aggregation). 
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could attract, the greater the likelihood that the lawyer would win the 
contest of having the collection of investors with the largest stake in the 
case. Courts increasingly have rejected this practice. A third factor is the 
bursting of the tech bubble and the subsequent market downturn, coupled 
with widespread reports of corporate misconduct at companies such as 
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. These events generated substantial losses 
for many investors and focused heightened attention on accountability for 
fraud. Finally, the record settlement in the Cendant litigation, involving a 
group of three prominent public pension funds as lead plaintiffs, may have 
signaled to institutions the potential value of active participation.50 
Although the studies are consistent with overall increased institutional 
participation, the increase does not appear to have been uniform. Public 
pension funds appear to have been considerably more active than other 
institutions. When one examines participation by institutions other than 
public pension funds, such as hedge funds, private pension funds, and 
trusts,51 the nature and effect of institutional participation becomes murky. 
It may also be difficult, particularly with some smaller investors, to 
determine whether they should be classified as institutions or individuals.52 
Importantly, these other institutions differ substantially from each other 
and from the large public pension fund or mutual fund that Weiss and 
Beckerman (and Congress) projected as the prototypical institutional lead 
plaintiff. These differences may go to the issue of whether the institutions 
are capable of responsibly serving as lead plaintiffs. Weiss and Beckerman 
assumed, with little discussion, that institutions will be typical and 
adequate representatives of other class members.53 Accordingly, Weiss 
and Beckerman devoted relatively little attention to exploring the ways in 
which institutional investors’ interests might diverge from those of the rest 
of the class. Similarly, Weiss and Beckerman focused on the institution as 
a singular entity, ignoring agency problems among actors within an 
 50. See, e.g., Sherie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff’s 
Perspective, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 
2004, at 27 (2004) (reporting that trend of increased involvement by public pension funds began 
shortly after the announcement of the “landmark” $2.8 billion Cendant settlement in 1999). 
 51. We have identified a handful of other lead plaintiffs that appear to be institutions but for 
which we cannot obtain detailed information. 
 52. Although our study is challenged by data limitations, we note that courts have been subject to 
similar problems. See, e.g., Malasky v. IAC/Interactive Corp, No. 04 CIV. 7447 (RJH), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3628, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2005) (revising lead plaintiff appointment after learning that 
plaintiff “New Hayward Holdings,” which was originally represented to be “a corporation engaged in 
financial money management,” was in fact a personal investment vehicle of an individual investor). 
 53. See, e.g., Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 32, at 2109 (“In class actions in which institutional 
investors serve as lead plaintiffs, questions relating to typicality rarely should arise.”). 
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institutional investor that might impede the institution’s ability to act in the 
interests of its own beneficiaries (and other members of the class). 
Weiss and Beckerman also endorsed institutional involvement based on 
the perception that institutional investors held substantial stakes, which 
would create appropriate incentives for them to monitor litigation 
decisions, and had the sophistication that would enable them to do so 
effectively.54 Institutional status, however, is a noisy proxy for having a 
substantial stake in the litigation. Many institutional lead plaintiffs are 
quite small and have relatively minor stakes.55 Similarly, many smaller 
institutions lack any particular sophistication. It is unclear why these 
institutions should be analyzed as distinct from individual lead plaintiffs 
with similar size stakes or why we should expect the institutions to add 
distinctive value to litigation. 
Mutual funds have failed to participate in securities fraud litigation at 
all, despite their substantial holdings. As Third Circuit Judge Edward 
Becker explains, mutual funds were the institutions that Congress really 
expected to serve as lead plaintiffs because of their substantial share of the 
securities market.56 Not only have mutual funds failed to serve as lead 
plaintiffs at all,57 but many of them do not even bother to file proof of 
claim forms to collect their share of litigation settlements.58 Recent 
lawsuits have alleged that mutual funds, in particular, are leaving billions 
of dollars on the table by failing to submit claim forms.59  
There are at least two obvious possible explanations for the failure of 
mutual funds to participate as lead plaintiffs. The first is the standard 
agency problem. Litigation decisions are made by mutual fund managers 
who are evaluated on the basis of fund performance relative to other funds 
 54. Id. at 2095 (“Institutions’ large stakes give them an incentive to monitor, and institutions 
have or readily could develop the expertise necessary to assess whether plaintiffs' attorneys are acting 
as faithful champions for the plaintiff class.”). 
 55. For example, Nature Shoes, Inc., lead plaintiff in a suit against Citrix, Inc., had a stake 
consisting of four calls, at a price of $400 each. Complaint at 5, Nature Shoes, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, 
Inc., No. 97-6234 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 1997), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1002/CTXS97/ 
001.html. 
 56. See Becker et al., supra note 42, at 2369. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in 
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005) (reporting evidence obtained from 
securities claims administrators that institutions are failing frequently to file securities class action 
claims). 
 59. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Watch, http://slw.issproxy.com/ (Jan. 25, 2005) (describing 
lawsuits against over 40 mutual fund managers alleging that they had failed to collect $2 billion worth 
of settlement proceeds by failing to file claim forms). 
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and market benchmarks. Litigation recoveries do not go to fund managers, 
but to fund beneficiaries.60 Because of the time lag between the fund’s 
trading and the resolution of litigation, litigation recoveries may not be 
fully reflected in performance figures. At the same time, a mutual fund’s 
participation as lead plaintiff would draw public attention to the fact that 
the fund has been the victim of fraud, perhaps reflecting adversely on the 
expertise of the fund’s managers. The second, and perhaps more 
important, explanation is that a substantial component of business for the 
major mutual funds involves managing retirement accounts for publicly 
traded issuers. Unlike litigation recoveries, the fees associated with these 
services go directly to mutual fund managers. Fund managers might 
reasonably be concerned that active litigation participation would hurt 
their ability to compete for this business from managers of public 
companies.61 
Hedge funds reflect a distinct group of institutional investors that has 
the potential to play a meaningful role in securities litigation.62 Hedge 
funds, due to their investing strategies, often have substantial stakes in 
particular companies. Hedge funds are typically sophisticated investors. 
The ability of hedge funds to hold concentrated interests rather than a 
diversified portfolio, coupled with the metrics by which hedge fund 
performance is measured, increase the likelihood that hedge fund 
managers will benefit from a litigation recovery relative to mutual fund 
managers. On the other hand, due to the distinctive trading strategies 
employed by hedge funds, these are the institutions most likely to face 
typicality objections to their taking the lead plaintiff position.63  
An additional factor that may affect the effectiveness of institutional 
oversight is the structure of institutional participation. Prior to the adoption 
of the PSLRA, many institutions were part of what was effectively a group 
 60. Interestingly, at least one case has rejected the application of a hedge fund as lead plaintiff on 
the basis that it was not a buyer for its own account, but rather was standing “in the place of whatever 
number of investors are participants in its managed fund.” In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 
96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000). This reasoning, despite being rather difficult to square with 
Congress’s purposes in adopting the lead plaintiff provision, might deter mutual funds from seeking 
lead plaintiff status. 
 61. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. O’BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH 
AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992) (reporting concern by mutual fund managers and 
other institutions such as banks about avoiding litigation in order to maintain the ability to sell 
products and services to defendant issuers). 
 62. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-425-SLR, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17094 
(D. Del. Oct. 6, 2003) (appointing four hedge funds as lead plaintiffs). 
 63. See, e.g., In re Bank One, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84 (rejecting lead plaintiff application by 
hedge fund that had engaged in extensive day trading including shorting of the issuer’s stock). 
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of plaintiffs that also included a number of individual investors.64 Courts 
have disagreed on whether groups should be appointed as lead plaintiffs 
under the PSLRA.65 Despite several decisions criticizing the appointment 
of unrelated investors as a lead plaintiff group, it remains commonplace 
for courts to appoint institutional investors, particularly smaller institutions 
(including public pension funds) as co-lead plaintiffs together with one or 
more individual investors.66 In some post-PSLRA cases, courts have 
appointed groups of public pension funds to serve as lead plaintiff.67  
It is unclear whether the potential effectiveness of institutional 
participation is reduced when an institution serves as a member of a mixed 
lead plaintiff group. Courts and commentators that have criticized the use 
of lead plaintiff groups argue that such groups are often formed by counsel 
and as a result do not exert the type of lawyer control that was the 
objective of the PSLRA.68 If this is true, institutional participation as part 
of a group may not be as effective in monitoring counsel, and we would 
not expect such groups to have a significant effect on fee awards or fee 
structures. Moreover, the appointment of a lead plaintiff group can lead to 
 64. See, e.g., In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25 (D. Mass. 1997) (lead plaintiffs consisted of 
World Futures Trading Company and five individuals). Existing data does not allow us to determine 
whether, prior to the PSLRA, these plaintiffs functioned as formal groups or simply collections of 
plaintiffs who had filed separate cases. 
 65. Compare In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811–16 (N.D. Ohio 1999) 
(rejecting the argument that a lead plaintiff should consist of a group of unrelated investors) with In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “rule of reason” should be 
applied to determine whether size and nature of group appointment is appropriate). See also Brief of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants on the Issues 
Specified at 17 n.13, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653), 
(endorsing concept of lead plaintiff group but arguing that group should consist of no more than five 
members). 
 66. See, e.g., Tice v. Novastar Fin., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16800, at *29 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 
23, 2004) (appointing institution and two individuals to “ensure a broader, more diverse representation 
of the class”); In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 114 (D.N.J. 1999) (appointing individual and 
institutional investors as co-lead plaintiffs); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 
47–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explicitly endorsing joint appointment of institution and several individuals 
on the basis that it would result in “diverse representation”). 
 67. We acknowledge that the concerns about the effectiveness of members of a lead plaintiff 
group are reduced when the group consists exclusively of institutional investors. Indeed, the lead 
plaintiffs in the Cendant litigation consisted of three large public pension funds. On the other hand, 
even in the Cendant case, the group structure presented some conflicts, particularly as to the 
appropriate fee award. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of 
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 717 n.363 (2002) (describing failure of two of 
the institutions to take a position on the fee issue). See also In Re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 226 
F.R.D. 298, 306–07 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (considering objections to appointment of six unrelated public 
pension funds). 
 68. See, e.g., Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 811–16 (stating that appointment of unrelated groups 
would thwart legislative purpose of greater client control); Fisch, supra note 49, at 69–77 (arguing for 
narrow reading of the statutory term “group”). 
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a fractured position among group members or cause some members to 
refrain from active participation.69  
We consider possible institutional differences by coding public pension 
funds separately from other institutions to explore the issue of whether any 
identified changes in litigation should be attributed to the participation of 
public pension funds or to institutions more generally. Our data do not 
permit full exploration of the effects of lead plaintiff groups, but we 
identify the issue for further research.  
IV. HYPOTHESES 
In this Part, we develop a series of hypotheses based on Congress’s 
purposes in adopting the lead plaintiff provision and anecdotal evidence 
relating to its effects. We construct propositions that we can test 
empirically using our data set and accepted statistical methodologies. 
Congress’s most conspicuous purpose in adopting the lead plaintiff 
provision was to encourage institutions to become more involved as lead 
plaintiffs. The anecdotal evidence discussed above, however, suggests that 
private institutions such as mutual funds have been reluctant to step 
forward to represent the class in securities fraud litigation. By contrast, 
public pension funds have stepped forward to take the lead plaintiff role in 
a number of high profile class actions, such as Cendant, Enron, and 
WorldCom. 
H1: Private institutions are no more likely to represent the class in 
the post-PSLRA period. 
H2: Public pension funds are more likely to represent the class in 
the post-PSLRA period. 
The Enron litigation suggests another hypothesis: Institutions are more 
willing to bear the costs of serving as lead plaintiff only in the highest-
stakes cases with the most egregious evidence of fraud. One weakness of 
the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision is that it does not provide a 
mechanism for compensating the lead plaintiff for its efforts in monitoring 
the litigation. The costs to the lead plaintiff of monitoring counsel are 
largely fixed; negotiating with counsel and supervising the attorneys’ work 
may take as much time and effort in a small case as in a large one. If those 
 69. See, e.g., Kloster v. McColl (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 350 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 
2003) (describing inability of lead plaintiff group to agree on whether to approve or object to proposed 
settlement and failure of some group members even to take a position); see also Fisch, supra note 67, 
at 717 n.363 (describing reported problems with lead plaintiff groups). 
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costs are non-trivial, institutional investors are likely to be willing to serve 
as lead plaintiff only when their returns from service (in the form of their 
pro rata share of increased net compensation, after subtracting attorneys’ 
fees) are likely to be substantial. Is the willingness of public pension funds 
to serve as lead plaintiff a pervasive phenomenon, or is it simply an 
artifact of a handful of salient, high-stakes lawsuits?70 
H3: Public pension funds are more likely to represent the class when 
the potential damage awards from litigation (the “stakes”) are 
greater and the evidence of fraud is stronger. 
Congress’s efforts to encourage institutions to serve as lead plaintiffs 
had a particular goal—to put investors in control of securities fraud class 
actions. A high-profile target for criticism during the hearings leading up 
to the enactment of the PSLRA was Bill Lerach, a named partner in the 
leading plaintiffs’ firm Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach. Lerach 
took particular heat for his boast that: “I have the greatest practice in the 
world because I have no clients.”71 The lead plaintiff provision was 
intended to change the relationship between the class representative and 
counsel, ensuring that there would be a “client” to oversee the efforts of 
the lawyers. Institutional investors, particularly those who are interested in 
overseeing the litigation actively, are unlikely to favor attorneys who are 
unresponsive to client concerns and who insist on exercising complete 
authority over litigation strategy. On the other hand, Milberg Weiss 
dominated securities fraud litigation during the time period of our study.72 
The firm was by far the largest of the traditional plaintiffs’ firms,73 and its 
size may correlate with greater expertise in litigating class actions and 
 70. An alternative explanation for a correlation between litigation stakes and public pension fund 
involvement is that the publicity surrounding a large-stakes case is likely much greater than for a 
small-stakes case. To the extent public pension fund managers (or the politicians to whom the 
managers answer) desire publicity, perhaps for political purposes, they will gravitate to only the larger-
stake cases. We do not attempt to distinguish this alternative explanation in this Article. For more on 
the political pressures facing public pension fund managers, see Roberta Romano, Public Pension 
Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993). 
 71. See In re Network Associates, Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(quoting law firm partner William Lerach). 
 72. See William S. Lerach, “The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995—27 Months 
Later”: Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Brave 
New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 606 (1998) (stating that Milberg, Weiss was involved in 
approximately thirty-one percent of securities fraud class actions before the adoption of the PSLRA 
and fifty-nine percent after the adoption of the statute). 
 73. On May 1, 2004, the firm split into two parts: Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Schulman LLP, 
based in New York City, and Lerach, Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins LLP, based in San 
Diego. See Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Schulman LLP, http://www.milberg.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 
2005). 
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greater resources to commit to cases. Do institutions select firms other 
than Milberg Weiss to represent the class? 
H4: Institutions are less likely to select Milberg Weiss as lead 
counsel for the class. 
The point of putting institutions in charge of class actions was to 
impose more careful monitoring on class counsel. Congress believed that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers tended to produce too little and charge too much. 
Specifically, Congress indicated a concern that risk-averse plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, rather than risk losing any return on a substantial investment in 
a case, might settle the action for less than a more highly motivated 
attorney would demand.74 Institutional investor plaintiffs are likely to be 
better diversified than their counsel and thus more willing to bear the risk 
of a summary judgment motion or a trial if necessary to gain a larger 
settlement or judgment. Institutional investors, it was thought, would 
discourage counsel from settling on the cheap, thereby increasing the 
accountability of defendants. 
On the question of overcharging, prior to the adoption of the PSLRA, 
the typical fee award was 25% to 33% of the class recovery.75 There 
appeared to be little variation with the stakes involved in the case, the 
likelihood of recovery, or the amount of effort that was necessary to 
produce the award.76 Congress believed that institutions would bargain 
hard on behalf of the plaintiff class, demanding a lower percentage fee 
award in larger cases and perhaps structuring fee agreements in order to 
provide attorneys with the incentive to produce better results for the class. 
H5: Institutional involvement correlates with greater recovery for 
the class, all other things being equal. 
H6: Institutional involvement correlates with lower fees for class 
counsel, all other things being equal. 
V. THE SAMPLE AND DATA 
To assess the impact of the lead plaintiff provision, we created two 
samples, a pre-PSLRA sample of firms sued under Rule 10b-5 with class 
 74. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Genesis of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 372 (1996). 
 75. See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries 
and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1253–54. 
 76. Id.  
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periods ending in 1991 to 1995 and a post-PSLRA sample of firms sued 
with class periods ending between 1996 and 2000.77 We stopped collecting 
data in 2000 to provide ample time to determine the resolution of the 
suits.78  
To make data collection tractable, we started with the sample used by 
Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard.79 Because that sample focused on firms in 
the computer hardware (Standard Industrial Code (“SIC”) 357) and 
computer software (SIC 737) industries, we supplemented the sample with 
an equal number of randomly selected sued firms in other industries. This 
broader sample makes our findings more generalizable. We excluded those 
firms where we could not find information on the identity of the lead 
plaintiff, leaving us with a total sample of 204 firms. Table 1A breaks 
down the sample by year, and Table 1B shows the industry breakdown. 
The pre-PSLRA sample contains 82 firms (40.2%) and the post-PSLRA 
sample contains 122 (59.8%). 
TABLE 1A: SAMPLE BY CLASS PERIOD END YEAR 
Class end Frequency Percentage of Total Sample 
1991 12  5.9  
1992 18  8.8  
1993 13  6.4  
1994 21  10.3  
1995 18  8.8  
1996 20  9.8  
1997 25  12.3  
1998 30  14.7  
1999 27  13.2  
2000 20  9.8  
Total  204                  100.0 
 
 
 
 77. The PSLRA was enacted on December 22, 1995. 
 78. We intend to extend our analysis beyond 2000 in future work. 
 79. See Johnson et al., supra note 10. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss4/1
p 869 Choi Fisch Pritchard book pages.doc 4/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? 887 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1B: SAMPLE BY SIC CODE 
SIC 
Code Industry Type Number
Percent of 
Sample 
1000 Agriculture, Mining, Construction 3 1.5 
2000 Textiles, Furniture, Chemicals and 
Paper 
19 9.3 
3000 Plastics, Metals, Machinery and 
Electronics 
71 34.8 
4000 Transportation and Communications 15 7.4 
5000 Wholesale and Retail Trade 17 8.3 
6000 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 1 0.5 
7000 Business and Miscellaneous Services 70 34.3 
8000 Health, Educational, Engineering and 
Accounting Services 
8 3.9 
For each of the firms in the sample, we collected data on the identity of 
the plaintiff(s) and counsel. To determine the lead plaintiff, we looked at a 
number of sources, including ISS’s Securities Class Action Services, 
Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, the web sites of several 
claims administrators, the web sites of the major plaintiffs’ firms, court 
cases contained in Westlaw, and SEC filing documents obtained through 
EDGAR and Lexis. In some cases, we had information on the precise 
identity of the lead plaintiff appointed by the court. In other cases, most 
commonly pre-PSLRA cases, we took the named plaintiff(s) in the latest 
documents we found for any particular litigation as the lead plaintiff. 
The plaintiff’s identity is coded as an institution where any named lead 
plaintiff in the litigation was a non-individual. As discussed above, we 
find that this necessarily defines as institutions many trusts and investment 
partnerships that are the functional equivalent of individual plaintiffs, as 
well as mixed groups including at least one institution together with one or 
more individual plaintiffs. We code public institutions such as government 
pension funds separately. 
We also collected data on the outcome of each suit (settlement, 
including amount, or dismissal), the time from filing to resolution, the fees 
awarded to the attorneys, and the court to which the case was assigned. 
We obtained information on the resolution of suits from the same sources 
that we searched for the lead plaintiff data. The Center for Research on 
Security Prices (“CRSP”) provided data on market capitalization and 
trading volume.  
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VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our first hypothesis, H1, postulates that institutions are no more likely 
to represent the class in the post-PSLRA period than they were prior to the 
law’s enactment. Table 2A depicts the breakdown between the institutions 
and individuals over the studied period. Non-individual plaintiffs are a 
constant presence over both the pre- and post-PSLRA periods, but there is 
a discernible upward trend during the post-PSLRA period.  
TABLE 2A: LEAD PLAINTIFFS 
 
Institutional v. Individual Lead Plaintiffs
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Year 
Individual 
Institution 
 
 
Table 2B compares the means of the pre- and post-PSLRA periods. 
Institutions are represented with greater frequency, but the difference does 
not reach the level of statistical significance. We caution here, however, 
against extrapolating too much from this (non) result. Our sample size is 
limited. More importantly, the anecdotal evidence suggests that 
institutional investors have become more common as lead plaintiffs in the 
last few years, a period not included in our sample.  
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TABLE 2B: SAMPLE BY SIC CODE 
Pre-PSLRA Fraction 
with Institution Lead 
Plaintiff 
N 
Post-PSLRA Fraction 
with Institution Lead 
Plaintiff 
N p-value 
0.18 80 0.26 124 0.17 
 
Our second hypothesis predicts that public pension funds became more 
active as lead plaintiffs after the enactment of the PSLRA. Here we find 
that the evidence strongly supports H2, with public pension funds going 
from no representation in the pre-PSLRA period to over 10% of the cases 
in the post-PSLRA period. The difference is significant at conventional 
significance levels.  
TABLE 2C: IDENTITY OF LEAD PLAINTIFF 
Panel 1 
Type Pre-PSLRA Percent Post-PSLRA Percent 
Individual  66    82.5%   92   74.2% 
Private Institution  14    17.5%   19   15.3% 
Public Pension    0     0.0%   13   10.5% 
Total  80 100.0% 124 100.0% 
Pearson chi-squared(3) = 9.14; Prob = 0.03 
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Panel 2 
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H3 predicts that institutions are more likely to intervene when the 
potential damages are greater and the evidence of fraud is stronger. For 
securities class action in our sample, we calculated the potential secondary 
market damages. To do so, we followed the methodology used by Jim Cox 
and Randall Thomas in recent work.80 First, we estimated a market model 
to generate expected stock market returns for each firm. The market model 
is estimated using returns for each firm for the one-year period ending six 
months prior to the beginning of the class period.81 Second, we assumed 
that the closing price on the day after the end of the class period represents 
the price after the market has fully taken into account the revelation of the 
fraud involved in the class action (termed the “benchmark” price). We use 
the estimated market model to generate the value line, working backward 
in time from the date of the benchmark price to the beginning of the class 
period. Third, we separated traders into high-activity and low-activity 
traders using the same assumptions from Cox and Thomas.82 Using these 
 
 
 80. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 768 n.100 (2003). 
 81. See id. (“We terminated our β calculations six months before the commencement of the class 
action period because our data sample consistently reflected abnormal stock price behavior in the 
three-month to six-month period before the commencement of the class period.”). 
 82. See id at 769 n.100. (citing Marcia Kramer Mayer, Best-Fit Estimation of Damage Volume in 
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assumptions, we adjusted the trading volume for each day in the class 
period, as apportioned between high-activity and low-activity trades, to 
account for the probability that shares purchased on a particular day in the 
class period may turnover before the end of the class period.83 Lastly, for 
each day in the class period, we multiplied the adjusted trading volume 
against the difference between the actual price and the value line for that 
day to determine potential damages for those who purchased on that 
particular day and held their shares to the end of the class period. We 
summed the potential damages for each day in the class period to generate 
a total potential damage award (termed the “stakes”). 
Table 3A presents the stakes available by lead plaintiff type. We find 
no significant difference, either before or after the PSLRA, in the cases 
involving private institutions. The story is different, however, with regard 
to public pension funds as lead plaintiffs. The public pension funds are 
involved, on average, in cases seeking nearly three times the damages as 
those cases in which the class is represented by an individual or 
individuals as lead plaintiff. The difference falls just short of statistical 
significance at the 10% confidence level. 
TABLE 3A: AVERAGE STAKES BY TYPE OF PLAINTIFF 
 Individual N Private Institution N p-value 
pre-PSLRA  683.5 65 260.4 14 0.61 
post-PSLRA 1015.7 90 938.1 18 0.93 
 Individual N Public Pension N p-value 
post-PSLRA 1015.7 90 2784.6 13 0.12 
Stakes are millions of dollars, adjusted to 2000 dollars using the CPI. 
 
 
Shareholder Class Actions: The Multi-Sector, Multi-Trader Model of Investor Behavior 110 (Nat’l 
Econ. Research Ass’ns, Working Paper, 2000)). Cox and Thomas assume that “low-activity traders 
hold about 63 percent of the shares and account for 17 percent of the trading, so that high-activity 
traders hold 37 percent of the shares and account for 83 percent of the trading.” See id. 
 83. Here we follow the method outlined in Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action 
Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (1996) for the two-trader model.  
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Are institutions becoming involved only in cases involving the 
strongest evidence of fraud? In other words, are institutions “cherry-
picking” the strongest cases? To evaluate the cherry-picking possibility, 
we consider one measure of the pre-filing strength of the cases in which 
pension funds take on the lead plaintiff role compared to other cases—the 
presence of an accounting restatement or an SEC investigation. We 
present these findings in Table 3B. 
TABLE 3B: PRESENCE OF PRE-FILING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT  
OF EARNING RESTATEMENT OR SEC INVESTIGATION RELATING  
TO CLASS PERIOD 
 Public Pensions N All Other Lead Plaintiffs N p-value 
post-PSLRA 0.462 13 0.225 111 0.064 
Restatements resulting from an accounting rule change, change of control, spin-off, or 
other non-fraud or mistake related reason are not counted. 
Of the thirteen securities class actions with a public pension fund lead 
plaintiff in the post-PSRLA period, six (46%) of the defendant firms made 
an announcement relating to an accounting restatement or an SEC 
investigation prior to the filing of the first complaint. In comparison, only 
25 out of the 111 cases (23%) with other types of lead plaintiff had a 
similar red flag. This difference is significant at the 10% confidence level. 
These results, combined with the data on stakes reported in Table 3A, 
suggest that public pensions tended to target both larger stakes cases and 
those with stronger evidence of fraud.  
H4 predicts that institutions are less likely to retain Milberg Weiss as 
lead counsel. This prediction is only partially borne out. Table 4A shows 
that private institutions are not significantly less likely to retain Milberg 
Weiss, before or after the PSLRA. Public pension funds, however, are 
substantially less likely to retain that firm post-PSLRA.84 Among all lead 
plaintiffs, the presence of Milberg Weiss is little changed across the pre- to 
post-PSLRA periods as reported in Table 4B. 
 
 
 84. We note that this result may not persist for time periods subsequent to our study. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the Milberg Weiss firm has been increasingly involved in the representation of 
public pension funds. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp., Sec. Litig.), 206 F.R.D. 427 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (appointing the Regents of the University of California as lead plaintiff and Milberg 
Weiss as lead counsel). 
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TABLE 4A: CHOICE OF MILBERG WEISS BY PLAINTIFF TYPE 
 Individual N Private Institution N p-value 
pre-PSLRA 0.517 58 0.462 13 0.72 
post-PSLRA 0.550 91 0.421 19 0.31 
 Individual N Public Pension N p-value 
post-PSLRA 0.550 91 0.231 13 0.03 
TABLE 4B: CHOICE OF MILBERG WEISS BY ALL LEAD PLAINTIFFS 
Pre-PSLRA Fraction 
with Milberg Weiss  N 
Post-PSLRA Fraction 
with Milberg Weiss N p-value 
0.51 71 0.50 123 0.88 
Our next set of hypotheses addresses the question of whether 
institutional involvement as lead plaintiff makes a difference in terms of 
the outcome for the class. Do institutional investors produce greater 
recovery for investors? Do hard bargaining and greater sophistication lead 
to fee agreements that lower the percentage of the recovery going to the 
attorneys? 
H5 predicts that an institutional lead plaintiff is likely to correlate with 
greater recovery for the class. Table 5A compares the outcomes based on 
the type of lead plaintiff. As a proxy for litigation success, we divide the 
settlement achieved by the stakes at issue. We define a “high-value 
outcome” as an outcome involving a settlement of more than 5% of the 
stakes.85 Thus, we deem litigation that results in a $1 million settlement 
 
 
 85. A settlement-to-stakes ratio of 5% results in roughly one-third of the suits qualifying as high-
outcome suits. While admittedly somewhat arbitrary, the 5% threshold provides a rough way of 
separating suits with a high likelihood of merit. For robustness, we rerun the tests using a 10% 
settlement-to-stakes ratio cutoff for high outcome suits (resulting in approximately 20% of the suits 
qualifying as high-outcome). We obtain qualitatively similar results as in Tables 5A and 5B. In the 
post-PSLRA period, the coefficient on private institution is positive and significant at the 10% 
confidence level. The coefficient on public pension, while positive, is now statistically insignificant. 
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where the stakes involved are $1 billion as far less successful than if the 
stakes involved are $1.1 million.  
Table 5A reports the percentage of each type of plaintiff producing a 
high-value outcome. We see that private institutions tend to correlate with 
a lower-value outcome prior to the PSLRA, although the difference is not 
significant. Public pension funds are more likely to have a high-value 
outcome, as predicted by H5, but, again, the difference is not significant. 
TABLE 5A: HIGH-VALUE OUTCOME BY PLAINTIFF TYPE 
 Individual N Private Institution N p-value 
pre-PSLRA 0.477 65 0.357 14 0.42 
post-PSLRA 0.289 90 0.316 19 0.82 
 Individual N Public Pension N p-value 
post-PSLRA 0.289 90 0.462 13 0.21 
High-Value Outcome defined as settlement for more than 5% of damages estimate. 
At first glance, the results for private institutions in particular are 
somewhat puzzling. Why aren’t private institutions falling in line with the 
prediction of Weiss and Beckerman and generating larger settlement 
awards as a fraction of the stakes for the class as a whole? One anecdotal 
answer is that mutual funds such as Vanguard and Fidelity are not getting 
involved as lead plaintiff. This reluctance was little changed by the 
PSLRA. In the Appendix, we report the identities of the different private 
institutional lead plaintiffs in the pre- and post-PSLRA periods. While we 
leave a more detailed examination of the backgrounds of the institutional 
lead plaintiffs for future research, we note that in both the pre- and post-
PSLRA periods, the private institutional lead plaintiffs are relatively small, 
unknown institutions. If the goal of the lead plaintiff provision was to 
 
 
 We do not use a linear measure of the settlement amount/stakes ratio as our dependent variable 
because a properly-specified regression model with this variable would require an independent 
variable measuring directors’ and officers’ insurance coverage. The availability of insurance is a 
critical factor in assessing settlement amounts, but this data is not publicly available. 
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encourage large mutual funds to participate more actively in securities 
fraud litigation, the PSLRA has failed. 
To better assess the effect of having an institutional investor as a lead 
plaintiff on recovery for the class, we ran a logistic regression using our 
High-Value Outcome variable as the dependent variable (1=High-Value 
Outcome; 0=not). In addition to the independent variables of interest, 
Private Institution and Pension Fund (dummy variables coded as one for 
private institutions and public pension funds respectively), we include as 
control variables the log of market capitalization (a dummy variable coded 
as one if Milberg Weiss represented the class) and a Busy Court dummy 
variable (coded as one for district courts in California and the Southern 
District of New York). These courts see substantially greater numbers of 
securities fraud class actions; judges’ familiarity with this type of litigation 
may lead them to take a different approach to these cases. We also include 
a dummy variable for Prefiling Hard Evidence, defined to equal one if a 
public announcement of an earnings accounting restatement or SEC 
investigation relating to the class period is made prior to the first filing of 
suit. Restatements resulting from an accounting rule change, change of 
control, spin-off, or other non-fraud or mistake-related reason are not 
counted. Note that Prefiling Hard Evidence is not included in the pre-
PSLRA model as Prefiling Hard Evidence is perfectly correlated with a 
High-Value Outcome. 
TABLE 5B: HIGH-VALUE OUTCOME LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Pre-PSLRA 
Variable Coefficient z P > |z| 
Constant   2.76   3.78 <0.01 
Private Institution −0.14 −0.31   0.76 
Market Cap (log) −0.51 −3.97 <0.01 
Milberg −0.23 −0.55   0.58 
Busy Court    .94   2.29   0.02 
Pseudo R2 = 0.28 N = 69 
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 Post-PSLRA 
Variable Coefficient z P > |z| 
Constant   0.97   1.81   0.07 
Private Institution   0.35   0.99   0.32 
Pension Fund   0.80   1.64   0.10 
Market Cap (log) −0.25 −3.06 <0.01 
Milberg −0.31 −1.15   0.25 
Busy Court   0.13   0.44   0.66 
Prefiling Hard 
Evidence   0.29   0.94   0.35 
Pseudo R2 = 0.12 N = 120 
Dependent variable is equal to one if the suit resulted in a High-Value Outcome and zero 
otherwise. 
The pre-PSLRA regression partly confirms the results of the univariate 
comparison in Table 5A—we find no significant effect from the presence 
of the private institution as a lead plaintiff. This result carries over to the 
post-PSLRA period. On the other hand, we do find that pension funds 
correlate with a significantly greater outcome for the class in the post-
PSLRA period (significant at the 10% confidence level). 
These findings may be sensitive to our approach and, in particular, to 
our method of defining a High-Value Outcome. As a robustness check 
(results not tabulated), we ran a separate set of regressions defining a high-
value outcome for our dependent variable as a settlement of more than 
0.5% of market capitalization (measured ten days prior to class end date), 
the threshold used to distinguish “meritorious” suits by Johnson, Nelson, 
and Pritchard.86 The coefficient for private institutions continues to be 
insignificant. We again find that pension funds are significantly more 
likely to be involved in a case producing a High-Value Outcome under 
this definition (now at the 1% confidence level).  
H6 predicts that institutions will bargain for lower class counsel fees. 
Because attorneys’ fees in these cases are almost always based on the 
percentage-of-recovery method, we focus on the fee award as a percent of 
the overall recovery. Table 6A compares fee awards in cases led by 
 
 
 86. See Johnson et al., supra note 10.  
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individual plaintiffs with those in cases led by institutional investors. We 
find no significant difference between individuals and private institutions, 
but we do find that public pension funds pay roughly five percentage 
points less than individuals. This difference is statistically significant and, 
potentially, economically quite important. When we compare the dollar 
figures, however, we see that pension funds are paying significantly 
greater fee amounts than individuals, presumably reflecting the fact that 
pension funds are participating in the higher-stakes cases. Because courts 
typically award a declining percentage of the overall recovery as recovery 
size increases,87 we need to control for case size in order to assess the 
effect of institutional participation. 
TABLE 6A: ATTORNEY FEES BY PLAINTIFF TYPE 
Fees as Percentage of Settlement 
 Individual N Private Institution N p-value 
pre-PSLRA 0.32 42 0.32 8  0.80 
post-PSLRA 0.30 56 0.31 14  0.46 
 Individual N Public Pension N p-value 
post-PSLRA 0.30 56 0.25 11 <0.01 
Fees in Millions of (2000) Dollars 
 Individual N Private Institution N p-value 
pre-PSLRA 3.69 42 1.79 8  0.47 
post-PSLRA 2.35 56 10.02 14 <0.01 
 Individual N Public Pension N p-value 
post-PSLRA 2.35 56 16.43 11 <0.01 
 
 
 87. See, e.g., Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales 
Practices Litig.), 148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that “percentage awards generally decrease 
as the amount of the recovery increases”). 
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To get a fuller understanding of the relation between the type of lead 
plaintiff and attorneys’ fees, we ran an ordinary least squares regression 
with the log odds transformation of the attorneys’ fee percentage of the 
settlement as our dependent variable.88 Do private institutions and/or 
pension funds manage to limit the amount of fees paid to the attorneys?  
Table 6B presents the results of our attorneys’ fees regression. In 
addition to the independent variables in the High-Value Outcome 
regression above, we also include a variable for the time between filing 
and resolution. Cases that take a longer time to resolve may require more 
attorney time and therefore justify a greater fee award. We include dummy 
variables corresponding to each of the ten deciles for the litigation stakes. 
Much of the work and effort on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys is relatively 
fixed, increasing only marginally with the overall size of the litigation. 
Attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the recovery therefore are likely to 
decrease with the size of the litigation as measured by the stakes variable. 
Including decile dummies for the range of litigation stakes provides a 
control for this size effect on attorney fee awards as a percentage of the 
recovery.89  
Additionally, an attorney’s performance may affect the fee award. In 
particular, we expect attorney’s fees to be higher when the attorney has 
produced a High-Value Outcome, as measured by a settlement reflecting a 
higher percentage of the stakes. To capture this possibility, we include a 
dummy variable for whether the litigation resulted in a settlement of 
greater than 5% of the stakes as a proxy of a High-Value Outcome.90  
 88. The log odds of the attorney fee fraction of the settlement is equal to ln (attorney fee 
fraction/(1-attorney fee fraction)).  
 89. The coefficients on the stakes decile variables are generally in the predicted direction; we 
have omitted them from the table, however, for clarity of presentation. 
 90. For a discussion on the High Value Outcome variable, see supra note 85 and accompanying 
text. 
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TABLE 6B: ATTORNEYS’ FEES REGRESSIONS 
Pre-PSLRA 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Prob>|t| 
Constant −1.00 −3.90 <0.01 
Private Institution   0.02   0.41   0.69 
Market Cap (log) −0.03 −1.38   0.18 
High Value Outcome    0.08   0.92   0.37 
Milberg   0.13   3.30 <0.01 
Busy Court −0.00 −0.07   0.95 
Prefiling Hard Evidence −0.06 −0.50   0.62 
Resolution Days (log)   0.04   1.23   0.23 
Adjusted R2 = 0.17 N = 46 
Post-PSLRA 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Prob>|t| 
Constant −0.81 −1.73 0.09 
Private Institution 0.16 1.73 0.09 
Pension Fund −0.03 -0.28 0.77 
Market Cap (log) 0.00 0.06 0.96 
High Value Outcome -0.10 -1.47 0.15 
Milberg 0.12 1.73 0.09 
Busy Court −0.10 −1.47 0.15 
Prefiling Hard Evidence −0.18 −2.10 0.04 
Resolution Days (log) 0.01 0.13 0.90 
Adjusted R2 = 0.19 N = 78 
Dependent variable for both regressions is the log odds transformation of the attorneys’ fee 
percentage of the settlement. 
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In the pre-PSLRA period, we see that private institutions had no 
significant effect on attorneys’ fees. Looking at the other variables, we see 
that Milberg Weiss generally commanded higher fees. In the post-PSLRA 
period, the coefficient on the Milberg Weiss dummy remains positive and 
statistically significant. Post-PSLRA, we also find a significant positive 
correlation between fees and the presence of a private institution. Private 
institutions are clearly not keeping fees in check. The coefficient on the 
public pension fund variable is negative, but it is not statistically 
significant. We conclude that our sample does not support the hypothesis 
that institutional lead plaintiffs help to keep attorneys’ fees in check.  
The only other variable that is significant in the post-PSLRA period is 
the Prefiling Hard Evidence dummy variable, which has a negative 
coefficient. Courts are apparently less generous with plaintiffs’ attorneys 
when the attorneys are provided with objective evidence suggesting fraud 
before the suit is filed.  
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Our empirical findings offer insight into the effect of the PSLRA on 
institutional participation in securities litigation. Contrary to popular 
belief, institutions did participate in litigation prior to the adoption of the 
PSLRA, typically as part of lead plaintiff groups. The pre-PSLRA 
institutional plaintiffs, however, appear to have been largely 
indistinguishable from individual plaintiffs, both in the size of their stakes 
and their effect on litigation outcomes. Following the adoption of the 
PSLRA, institutional lead plaintiffs, collectively, continue to have no 
statistically significant effect.  
The most significant change in lead plaintiff identity subsequent to the 
adoption of the PSLRA is the emergence of public pension funds as class 
representatives. Public pension funds seem to possess precisely the 
attributes envisioned by Congress—substantial litigation stakes and a level 
of sophistication that enables them to monitor class counsel actively. The 
question remains, however, whether public pension funds are having a 
meaningful effect on settlement sizes or attorneys’ fee awards. We report 
evidence that public pension fund participation is correlated with a greater 
likelihood of a High-Value Outcome from litigation. We also provide 
evidence, however, consistent with the view that public pension funds are 
simply cherry-picking by participating in cases in which characteristics 
observable prior to the filing of suit indicate the case is likely to result in a 
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large settlement. Because of our sample size, we cannot draw definitive 
conclusions from these results. This possibility warrants further study 
before any firm conclusion can be drawn. Moreover, we find no 
statistically significant correlation between public pension fund 
participation and reduced fee awards. Accordingly, at least through the end 
of 2000, public pension fund involvement does not seem to be realizing 
the potential hoped for by Congress.  
There are several possible explanations. One may be that agency 
problems limit the effectiveness even of public pension funds. As 
government actors subject to political influence, public pension funds may 
actively seek involvement in high-profile cases, such as Cendant and 
Enron, but may add little affirmative value to the litigation process. 
Alternatively, public pension funds may focus on politically salient results 
such as the adoption of corporate governance reforms or the contribution 
of settlement funds by individual defendants, instead of seeking to 
maximize the class recovery.91 A third possibility is that, in strong cases 
involving substantial stakes, institutions may prefer to opt out of class 
litigation to bring their own individual action. This option is likely to 
produce a faster and possibly higher recovery for the institution but 
eliminates the institution as a potential lead plaintiff in the class suit. 
Some evidence does exist that the post-PSLRA period correlates with 
reduced attorneys’ fee awards for Milberg Weiss, all other things being 
equal.92 This difference does not persist, however, when we include 
control variables in our multi-variate logistic regression. Millberg’s 
presence correlates with a higher fee award both before and after the 
PSLRA. Our study also indicates that Milberg Weiss is less likely to 
represent public pension funds in the post-PSLRA period, at least during 
the time period we examine. These findings may indicate increased 
competition among plaintiffs’ attorneys firms to become lead counsel. 
Alternatively, because our study focuses on the time period immediately 
after the adoption of the PSLRA, our findings may indicate differing 
responses among plaintiffs’ firms to the statute, in which case we would 
 91. It is not clear that this result is undesirable. Public pension fund involvement may have the 
effect of making private litigation function more like public enforcement which values deterrence and 
accountability in addition to compensation. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the 
Role of the Plaintiff, 60 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 175–76, 198 (1997) (observing that focus on 
deterrence objective lowers the conceptual barrier between private litigation and government 
enforcement actions). 
 92. On a summary statistic level, the mean attorney fee percentage of the settlement award for 
Milberg Weiss in the pre-PSLRA period was 32.6% compared with only 30.3% in the post-PSLRA 
period (difference significant at the 1% level). 
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expect to see the effect disappear in future years. In particular, we note 
that the overall frequency with which Milberg Weiss appears as a lead 
counsel does not change between the pre- and post-PSLRA periods. 
Finally, we observe that the stated congressional preference for 
institutional lead plaintiffs and the statutory authority conferred by the 
lead plaintiff provision do not appear to have enhanced the role of 
institutions other than public pension funds in monitoring class counsel. 
Other institutions such as hedge funds and private pension funds, when 
they participate as lead plaintiffs, do not seem to have an effect on the 
litigation. Because some of these institutions, particularly hedge funds, 
seem to possess the substantial stakes and sophistication to enable them to 
function more effectively, the question of why they have failed to do so is 
an important subject for future research. In particular, it is worth exploring 
whether courts are inappropriately restricting institutional influence by 
appointing lead plaintiff groups or by questioning the ability of institutions 
to meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
After ten years of experience under the PSLRA, courts are still 
struggling with how best to interpret and implement the lead plaintiff 
provision. With this provision, Congress intended to encourage 
institutional involvement in securities fraud litigation. The hope was that 
institution would help produce better litigation outcomes for shareholders 
at a lower cost. Our study offers preliminary evidence on whether 
Congress has achieved these objectives. 
On the issue of institutional participation, we find that the PSLRA has 
had an effect on the participation of only one type of institution—the 
public pension fund. Public pension fund participation as lead plaintiff has 
increased substantially since 1995 and continues to increase. Beyond the 
public pension fund, however, institutional participation remains 
unchanged. Levels of overall institutional participation remain relatively 
consistent. Private institutions that participate tend to be relatively small, 
both pre- and post-PSLRA. Other large institutions, particularly mutual 
funds, have failed to participate at all. 
As for the effects of institutional participation, our data show only 
mixed results. Public pension funds correlate with a greater likelihood of a 
High-Value Outcome. We are unable, however, to rule out the possibility 
that public pensions are selectively participating in only those cases with 
the largest potential damages and the most glaring indicia of fraud. We 
also find that when we control for the size of the case, institutional 
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participation—even pension fund participation—does not correlate with 
lower attorney fee awards. At this point, the case for the lead plaintiff 
provision has not yet been proven. 
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APPENDIX–LIST OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE DATA SET 
Pre-PSLRA Private Institutions 
Acker Capital Partnership  
D.M.D. Pension Trust  
Jefferson Heritage Partners, Ltd. 
Minnick Capital Management 
Overseas Corporation  
Peregrine Options, Inc. 
Pisnoi Lumber & Trim Co., Inc., Pension Trust  
S.H.E. Medical Associates, P.C.  
Sidney Weinstein, Trustee for the Marigold Marketing Profit Sharing Plan 
Software Design Systems, Inc.  
TDA Trading Corp. 
World Futures Trading Company  
ZSA Asset Allocation Fund and ZSA Equity Fund 
ZVI Trading Corp Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan 
 
Post-PSLRA Private Institutions  
American Bancredit Corp  
Androsia International Trade 
Brenner Clinical Psych P.C. Pension Plan & Trust 
Bulldog Capital Management LP 
De Wind Partners LP  
Emanon Partners LP 
Federal National Insurance Co.  
Fuller & Thaler Asset Management, Inc. 
Glyn Emerging Opportunity Fund, LP  
Golfway Developments, Inc.  
Great Neck Capital Appreciation Partnership LP 
Imperial Equity of Nevada Inc.  
Lion Holdings LLC, King Asset Trust 
Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund  
Nature Shoes Inc. 
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Nomanbhoy Group 
Perkins Partners I LTD  
Teamsters Local 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund Plan and Local 144 
Nursing Home Pension Fund 
VIP World Asset Mgmt, T.F.M. Investment Group 
 
Post-PSLRA Public Pensions 
Birmingham Retirement & Relief Fund 
City of Philadelphia Board of Pension & Retirement 
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds 
Florida State Board of Administration and Louisiana State Employees’ 
Retirement System 
Kansas Farm Bureau Pension Trust and Kansas Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Co. 
Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System and Louisiana 
School Employees' Retirement System 
Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System 
New Hampshire Retirement System 
Philadelphia Board of Pensions & Retirement 
Police and Firemen Retirement System of City of Detroit 
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